专题学术主持人 Guest Editors of the Special

曹凯中 CAO Kaizhong
中国传媒大学艺术学部副教授/本刊特约编辑
Associate professor in the Faculty of Art, Communication University of China, and contributing editor of this journal

赵晶 ZHAO Jing
北京林业大学园林学院副教授/本刊副主编
Assistant professor in the School of Landscape Architecture, Beijing Forestry University, and deputy editor-in-chief of this journal

戴维·库珀，曹凯中，张楚晗，青锋.花园实践：一种对“安静”美德的理解[J].风景园林，2023，30（3）：10-17.

花园实践：一种对“安静”美德的理解

著：（英）戴维·库珀　译：曹凯中　张楚晗　校：青锋

摘要：无论是东方还是西方，花园的实践往往被赋予道德的诉求。对花园实践所体现与孕育的美德进行重点探讨，区分了花园外在、伴随而来的美德与内在、核心的美德。后者所包含的谦虚、关怀等品质，是花园实践繁茂不衰的必要条件。这些内在的美德被称为一种“安静”的美德，因为这些美德往往与安乐、平和、无为而治等一系列古典哲学理想所联系。正是对安静美德的关注，促使花园成为苦难的庇护所与智慧的源泉。对花园是特定美德的理想孕育环境的原因进行探讨，发现其中的奥秘在于，在花园里人类的劳作与自然过程相互渗透、相互影响，这使得人们认识到了自然的伟大之处，也认识到了自身的局限，对自然的敬仰进一步培养出诸如谦逊这样的美德。

关键词：花园实践；美德；谦逊；安宁

中图分类号：TU986
文献标识码：A
文章编号：1673-1530(2023)03-0010-08
DOI：10.12409/j.fjyl.202210250601
收稿日期：2022-10-25
修回日期：2023-01-28

从古至今，花园被赋予了各式各样广泛的道德目的。一位中国宋代的官员就曾说过，在园林中感受亭子及其周围的环境比起说教更能有效地教化人[1]。举一个最近的例子，在一年一度的切尔西花展上，游客们会看到为鼓励人们拯救地球而建造的生态花园，以警示进一步环境恶化将带来的悲惨境遇。

正如这些例子所表明的，事实上对于花园道德目的的许多说法存在很大的差异，从鼓励严格自律到巩固维多利亚时代的工业和家庭生活价值观，花园的道德目的本身也各不相同。它可以激发爱国之情、促进正义感，甚至增强社区意识。很受欢迎的安维克花园（Alnwick Garden）就在我居住的英格兰东北部，这座花园的道德诉求包括：为社区最弱势成员提供福祉、良好的教育和更多的权益，以及激励人们成为应对气候危机的变革者。

人们提出了各式各样的方法来说明花园是如何实现其道德目的的，其中包括说教式的道德教训和更为微妙地对美好理念的呈现。以前者举例，斯托园（Stowe garden）的寺庙中包含一座纪念古代美德的雕像，以及一座伪造的废墟，旨在传达到18世纪已经没有美德值得称颂了。以后者举例，同样创作于18世纪的“万能”布朗的非正式自然景观体现了英国人对自由的热爱和向往。（相比之下，正式的法国花园则被认为是控制和支配欲望的典范。）其他的花园被认为给道德反思提供合适的环境和培育的土壤，还有一些花园则是旨在灌输“工作道德”。（一些维多利亚时代的作家和园林师认为，大力进行花园实践可能会转移年轻男女对性的关注。）前文提到的安维克花园就是通过教育课程来实现道德目的，课程包括为鼓励可靠安全食品生产的“社区冰箱”“气候行动课程”及“毒性花园”，来提醒游客重视自然环境。

从我所举的例子中可以清楚地看到，我所说的“道德目的”并不仅仅指那些与原则、权利和义务有关的诉求。我所关注的是一种更广泛的、更古老的道德或伦理观念，这些观念指向了人类生活的美好和繁荣。在这篇文章中，我将在这个更宽泛的理解之上，重点关注一种特别重要的形式的道德目的，当然也是一种具有哲学意味的形式，这个有趣的形式存在于很多不同的传统之中。这种形式的道德目的认为，花园实践可能有助于培养美德，可以说，花园实践在美德教育中发挥着重要作用。我这里所说的“美德”，是指那些至少能对促进美好繁荣生活有着积极贡献的品质。（需要指明的是，我指的是花园实践而不是单纯的种植设计，因为种植设计可能是这些实践中最核心的，但并不是唯一的。园林师从事的其他实践包括设计花坛或凉棚、鼓励野生动物进入花园，以及在花园中设置装饰品等设施。）

毫无疑问，我想讨论的是一个非常古老的想法——正如人们普遍认为花园可以有道德目的一样。罗马作家小普林尼（Plini The Younger）在创作花园时的抱负是自我升华并过上美好而真实的生活[2]。这个将花园作为“道”的理念在伟大的东亚传统中也非常突出。正如这些传统所理解的，“道”不仅仅是一种娱乐、爱好或活动，更是一种自律、自我发展和生理-精神培育的实践[3]。此外，我所讨论的概念仍然存在于当前的时代。例如，我们相信美好的花园可以培养出与自然世界

相适应的态度。也有人认为，对于吸毒和酒精成瘾的年轻人，花园或许可以重建他们对工作价值的认识，并建立与他人的联结[4]。

正如前文所述，被花园实践所培养的所谓美德是多种多样的，包括爱国主义、自律、环境正义、勤奋和其他许多美德。我想讨论的问题是，花园实践是否存在一些内在的或者固有的美德，而其他美德充其量只是这些附带的，或是偶然获得的。换句话说，是否存在那些所谓属于花园实践本质的美德?

花园可以被设计成士兵的野战训练场，从而向他们灌输血气之勇。富裕的英国人曾经设计过包含户外剧院的花园，目的是为了促进人们对音乐或戏剧的审美和欣赏。但我认为，这些都是强加给花园的功能，而花园实践本身并不特别适合勇气的培养或音乐的欣赏。斯托园的寺庙也是同样的情形，通过雕像、石头上的铭文等来传达道德的教训。

几年前，我在德国看到过一个布局凌乱、几乎没有植物、多沙的非主流花园。这座非主流花园与同一区域植物繁茂的公园形成了强烈的对比，而这座花园的设计者设计该花园的初衷是为了唤起人们对世界贫困的良知，而事实上这座花园也非常有效地实现了这一设计目的。但鼓励人们关注贫富差距并不是我前文所提到的花园内在的美德。简言之，花园可以用各种方式来呼唤人们内心的美德或美好的品质（包括我已经在前文提到的几种），但这些并不都反映花园实践的本质。也就是说，并非所有的美德都是由花园实践本身的特性所培育的。

相比之下，探讨诸如耐心、谦逊、关爱、希望等美德，以及中国人所说的“敬”（一种对事物的敬重），在我看来才属于花园实践的本质内容，而勇气、欣赏音乐和对穷人和饥饿者的同情则不属于。简而言之，这些是营造美好花园所必需的品质。更确切地说，如果忽略了这些品质，实践者只有足够幸运，才能够建造和维护一个繁茂的花园。所谓繁茂的花园是指花园里鲜花美丽地绽放、蔬菜美味而有营养、鸟儿感到安全和友好。人们至少可以设想：如果某个花园所处的气候、土壤、野生动物和周围环境都非同寻常的温和适宜，那么即使实践者很不耐烦、粗心、无礼或是过于自信，花园也能长出美味的胡萝卜或美丽的鸢尾花。这些实践者确实很幸运，因为花园的成功并不是他们的功劳，而是天时地利的好运。

在正常情况下，像谦逊这样的美德，对于花园实践的成功是至关重要的。这里的谦逊，是指正确地意识到一个人对于不受他控制的条件的依赖。例如当实践者忽视季节或天气变化所产生的影响，这样的忽视某种程度上会带来很大的实践风险。同理，实践者对植物、树木以及其他生物的利益进行一系列的关怀也会产生美德。而不好的实践者可能会忽略日常的修剪和保护，即使存在这样的过失，花园仍然可以硕果累累，只能说这样的实践者是幸运的。

不言而喻，花园实践是一种技能和专业领域。它的内在或固有美德是指那些在通常情况下践行这些技能和专业实践所需要的美德，或者说践行花园之“道”所要求的美德。换作在柔道和其他武术的语境下，这些美德则包括勇气、决心和对对手的尊重。这些都是这类技艺的内在美德：而胆小、犹豫但自负的斗士若能赢得比赛将实属幸运。我认为在花园实践中，一些“安静”的美德（包括关爱、谦逊等）才是最为重要的。或者说，这是我所提出的观点。

为什么我把它们统称为“安静”的美德?其原因有 2 个。其中一个原因是，这些美德与那些宣称更强劲、更尖锐的社会和政治行动主义（activism）形成了鲜明的对比。比如说，实现全球平等、拯救地球、摆脱腐败政权这类目标可能会被针对不公正的强烈愤慨和感知，以及对子孙后代福祉的担忧等认知所推动，反之这些目标也激励了这些美德。因此从这个意义上来说，行动主义与笔者所说的“安静主义”（quietism）形成了对比。相对于行动主义，安静主义者有更温和、更个人化而更少政治驱动的优势。我认为，在道德诉求范畴之中，花园实践的内在美德更倾向于安静主义者而不是行动主义者那一端①。

也许提到安静美德的另一个更重要的原因是，它们与许多古老和传统的理想有着密切的联系，这些理想本身被定义为安静的状态。在这些目标或理想中，有古希腊人所推崇的安定（希腊语：ataraxia）和平和（希腊语：apatheia）——这是一种免于纷扰和激情的自由。自希腊向东，我们发现了镇定（希腊语：upekkha），这是佛陀告诫他的追随者去寻求的“崇高境界”（梵天）之一。继续向东，我们遇到了道教圣人推崇的“无为”（不行动，或毫不费力的行动）。这些传统理想的共性都是对平静、安逸、不受干扰生活的赞美——正如一位罗马斯多葛派的塞内卡花园爱好者所描述的一种“幸福、平静、泰然自若”的生活[5]。安静美德被培养出的首要的目的是让人们在生活中保持平静或达到与之类似的状态。也就是说，安静美德是这种平静生活的核心组成部分。这样看来，“安静的美德”是一种合适的称呼，用来指代那些能够引导这样状态的美德。

认识到安静的美德是内在于花园实践的这一点，非常有助于理解许多对于花园意义的观点，这些观点甚至可以追溯到古代。在这些观点中，我将重点关注其中 2 个：一个观点将花园视为休憩或庇护的场所；另外一个观点将花园视为理解与智慧的源泉。

如果安静的美德是花园实践的内在美德，那么将花园认为是一个休憩或庇护的场所就很容易理解了。从字面意义上讲，花园一直是人们寻求保护以及与外界隔绝的地方，偶尔也会充当避难所。在一些中文著作中，花园往往被认为是一个可以暂时摆脱“世界的灰尘和污垢”的场所。安德鲁·马维尔（Andrew Marvell）在他的著名诗歌《花园中的思想》中则表达花园可以产生出一种“美丽的宁静”甚至“美味的孤独”，显然，无论是“美丽的宁静”还是“美味的孤独”，它们都是可以被享用的[6]。

然而更有趣的是，至少在我讨论的语境下，花园作为庇护所的形象更具比喻性或隐喻性。我心目中的花园是一个有可能培养和锻炼美德的空间，而这些美德在日常工作、商业和社交的外部世界中是很难，甚至是不可能实现的。马维尔将纯真、安宁和安静这些在繁忙的日常生活中几乎没有机会获得的

体验列为花园所能提供的奖励之一[7]。在现在的世界中能享有这种安静的美德也成为一项巨大的挑战。因为这是一个咄咄逼人的、燥热的、充满斗争的世界，谦卑、洞见、宽容和耐心等美德在这个世界显得格格不入。在商业中心或繁忙的办公室里，似乎没有时间和地点来培养这种美德。中国文人和马维尔一样，都是为了过上他们认为更美好的生活而在寻求庇护，在这样喧闹的世界中，安静美德可以得到更有效地发挥。对小普林尼来说，从宜人的花园孕育出的安静美德使花园本身逐渐成为一个美好而真实生活的场所——当然他知道在罗马的街头实践这些美德很难，甚至很危险。基于这种认识，在花园里，那些在日常世界中如此不受欢迎的美德，有了可以“呼吸”的空间和时间。因此，花园被视为美德的庇护所。

对安静美德的强调也解释了古代将花园视为“孕育一切的舞台”这一观点，即花园不但孕育了美德，也帮助人们理解了人与现实世界的发展规律。显然，这种理解并不来自单纯的理论、知识以及技术，在古代这种理解被认为是一种智慧。伊壁鸠鲁（Epicurus）在雅典的花园被描述为可以提供哲学教育的空间[8]73-74②。而欧洲中世纪基督教的花园旨在揭示出宗教的真理。西班牙当代著名的园林师费尔南多·卡伦乔（Fernando Caruncho）认为花园是可以提供精神和认知体验的场所，我认为他的这一观点代表了当代很多园林师的观点[9]。

强调花园对道德和认识论的帮助，和强调花园对美好生活和智慧的贡献，这两者之间不应存在竞争的关系。这样的比较终究是模糊的。对知识的渴求与对生活的渴望之间往往没有明确的界限。正如英国花园实践者和作家阿拉斯戴尔-福布斯（Alasdair Forbes）所说的，思考或审问我们应该如何生活是一种可以促进美好生活的方式[10]。而只有在道德被崇尚的环境下，追求智慧才有可能。在前文提到的东亚文化中，一个人的道德水平发展，是伴随着他对周围世界，以及自己在其中所处位置的认识逐步提升的，在这个过程中，“道”发挥了重要的作用。

在这里，有一点值得详细阐述。那就是对于伊壁鸠鲁、卡伦乔来说，花园是适合孕育知识和传播知识的。这里所说的知识不是通过堆积数据和证据，或通过开展一些研究项目可以获得的知识，也不是通过研讨会或头脑风暴会议上进行激烈的辩论以及激动人心的思想交流来获得的那种命题性的、经验性的、技术性和科学性的知识。例如人们对“宇宙的和谐”“灵魂与物质的关系”这些问题的答案是在伊壁鸠鲁的花园中逐渐被孕育出来的，而非来自技术性的宣教[8]7。玛吉·凯斯维克（Maggie Keswick）认为，禅宗花园以其自身特有的安静呈现出禅宗中“对道无以言表的体验”[11]。也有人认为，禅宗花园追寻并提供了“被禅所启发的感知者所看到的世界的一瞥”[11]。

这些理解方式并不在于承认某些命题或信仰的真实性。当然，这并不是否认一个好的实践者需要了解很多信息（关于繁殖、土壤酸碱度、天气模式等），也不是否认一位好的实践者需要掌握大量的专业技能：当然，实践者必须具备修剪、嫁接或种植时所需的技能。但我试图阐明的理解方式不是一系列信息碎片，也不是个人的诀窍和技能。

相反，它们采取的是让人们体验或感知现实，或者说以事物之道的形式，来理解事物。这是一种接近哲学的理解方式，这种方式也不太可能被傲慢和不耐烦的人所接受，因为他们仅仅专注于自己的日常事务。事实上，这种理解事物的方式也不适用于专心追求技术知识的人。相反只有那些有耐心、乐于接受新事物的人才能拥有这种理解方式，他们能够从身边那些实际问题中抽离出来，并且愿意按实际情况做出反应。不难理解，那些在花园实践中具备安静美德的人，也更容易获得关于花园的这种理解。正如古人所说，对于智慧的理解需要谦逊、耐心、尊重、正念和其他安静的美德，不同于现代社会所崇尚的以计算为核心的技术思维，这种智慧预设了一种开放、沉静、清晰，甚至是纯真的状态[12]。

如果一个读者认同我对于花园实践能够孕育安静美德这一理念，他们或许会提出以下问题：花园实践在这方面有什么独特之处吗？为什么花园会格外适合孕育这些美德及其理解方式？难道其他非花园式的休憩和庇护所不能达到同样的效果吗？像马塞尔·普鲁斯特（Marcel Proust）一样，退隐到巴黎一间衬着软木的房间里完成一部伟大的小说不是同样可以达到目的吗？像肯·凯西（Ken Kesey）那样和一群嬉皮士驾驶改装过的鲜艳巴士穿越美国不是同样有效吗？

我不想在这里独断专行地认为只有花园才能成为培养出安静美德及其理解方式的舞台。但我想指出，这是一个特别合适培养安静美德的空间。这其中的一个原因在于花园与自然之间的互动，以及它们互动的方式。这种互动让花园与自然环境、动物、植物和其他自然要素之间密切接触。伊壁鸠鲁认为人类对自然的理解来自花园的论断绝非偶然。同样不出意外的是，那些被道家所影响的诗人，比如5世纪初的诗人陶渊明，就是在花园中探寻符合天然之道的“自然”（实际上就是道自身）。

文化与自然之间的关系是一个很大的主题，我只谈其中的几个方面。英国哲学家玛丽·米格利（Mary Midgley）质疑了存在主义思想家让-保罗·萨特（Jean-Paul Sartre）所认为的世界是“死的物质”这一观点。此观点认为我们作为完全自由的生物可以将我们的意志与计划施加于“死的物质”之上。米格利认为，如果注意到“生物圈”这一囊括了植物和动物的世界，他们应该不会接受人类中心主义的观点[13]。

此外，由于他们一生都在酒吧、咖啡馆、爵士俱乐部、电影院和其他典型的全人工环境中度过，因此他们未能对自然世界给予应有的关注。米格利想要表达的意思可以理解为，若一直以来厌恶乡村的萨特在远离城市的地方完成了一天的花园实践，他应该很快就会意识到我们对自然界的依赖，以及我们的“野心”将面临的严峻制约。简而言之，米格利暗示的是，像花园实践者那样沉浸在自然环境中，并且与之互动，对于孕育安静美德——甚至是认识到这些的确是美德——是至关重要的。

花园实践所产生一系列与自然有意无意的接触有助于教会我们谦卑、宽容、耐心和希望，也有助于激发我们对自然的关怀和尊重。好的花园实践者不仅知道他们的成功取决于与大自然之间的合作，还知道如果不重视植物、土壤和生物存在的意义，获得成功是不可能的。实际上，花园的实践者学会了履行照顾和关怀的职责，在我们闯入自然世界之时，这些义务应该与之相伴。当我们将自然归入文化、艺术和实用性的范围时，我们同时也应将自然纳入道德关注的范围。如果说花园是对那些我们无法控制事情的有力提醒，那么它同时也标志着大自然对人类野心与企划的依赖性和易感性。花园实践也许是人类文化实践和自然之间相互依赖、相互改变、相互渗透的最显著例证[14-15]③。这也就是为什么我会提出花园作为一种培养美德的场所具有不可替代的优越性。

注释：

① 我对“安静主义”一词的使用不同于其他用法，例如，作为 17 世纪法国基督教神学运动的名称，或作为与路德维希·维特根斯坦相关的某种哲学研究风格的标签。

② 笔者认为，在广义上，花园是“揭示”世界的一个重要手段。参见参考文献 [8]。

③ 阿拉斯戴尔-福布斯建议使用“多孔性”（porousness）一词。

参考文献 (References)：

[1] LI K R. Landscape Improvement and Scenic Sites in Pre-Modern China: A Critical Review[D]. Sheffield: The University of Sheffield, 2005: 138.

[2] The Letters of the Younger Pliny[M]. London: Penguin, 1963: 43, 112.

[3] KIRKLAND R. Taoism: The Enduring Tradition[M]. New York: Routledge, 2004: 33.

[4] DON M. Growing Out of Trouble[M]. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2006.

[5] SENECA L A. Moral Letters to Lucilius[M/OL]. London: Heinemann. [2022-09-19]. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius.

[6] QUILLER-COUCH A. The Oxford Book of English Verse 1250–1918[M]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955: 402.

[7] KIDD I J. Gardens of Refuge[EB/OL]. (2021-10-04) [2022-09-19].https://daily-philosophy.com/kidd-gardens-of-refuge/.

[8] HARRISON R P. Gardens: An Essay on the Human Condition[M]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008: 73-74.

[9] CARUNCHO F. The Spirit of the Geometrician[M]// KINGSBURY N, RICHARDSON T. Vista: The Culture and Politics of Gardens. London: Frances Lincoln, 2005: 114.

[10] FORBES A. On Psyche's Lawn: The Gardens at Plaz Metaxu[M]. London: Pimpernel Press Ltd, 2020: 19.

[11] SAITO Y. Japanese Gardens: The Art of Improving Nature[J]. Chanoyou Quarterly, 1996 (83): 59.

[12] HEIDEGGER M. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays[M]. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.

[13] MIDGLEY M. Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature[M]. London: Methuen, 1980: 18-19.

[14] COOPER D E. A Philosophy of Gardens[M]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

[15] COOPER D E. Gardens and the Way of Things[M]// GIESECKE A, JACOBS N. Earth Perfect?: Nature, Utopia and the Garden. London: Black Dog, 2012.

（编辑 / 刘玉霞）

著者简介：

（英）戴维·库珀 / 男 / 英国杜伦大学哲学系荣休教授 / 著有《花园的哲理》（*A Philosophy of Gardens*）一书 / 研究方向为东方和西方哲学史、美学、环境伦理学和语言哲学

译者简介：

曹凯中 / 男 / 博士 / 中国传媒大学艺术学部副教授 / 本刊特约编辑 / 研究方向为数字艺术在风景园林设计中的应用、风景园林评论

张楚晗 / 女 / 西安建筑科技大学在读博士研究生 / 中国建筑设计研究院有限公司生态景观建设研究院工程师 / 研究方向为城市设计理论

校者简介：

青锋 / 男 / 博士 / 清华大学建筑学院副教授 / 研究方向为建筑历史与理论、建筑评论

COOPER D E．Garden Practices, “Quiet” Virtues, and Understanding[J]. Landscape Architecture, 2023, 30(3): 10-17. DOI: 10.12409/j.fjyl.202210250601.

Garden Practices, “Quiet” Virtues, and Understanding

Author: (GBR) David E. Cooper　Translators: CAO Kaizhong, ZHANG Chuhan　Proofreader: QING Feng

Abstract: In both Western and Asian traditions, moral purposes have been assigned to gardening and related practices. The focus in this paper is upon virtues that gardening practices may manifest and foster. A distinction is made between virtues incidental to gardening, and those internal or essential to it. The latter — including humility and care — are virtues required for gardens to flourish. These internal virtues are referred to as “quiet” ones, for they are virtues associated by the Ancients with such ideals of tranquillity as ataraxia, equanimity and *wu-wei*. Attention to these quiet virtues, it is argued, explains why gardens have been regarded both as places of refuge and ones conducive to wisdom. The question is addressed, finally, of why the garden is an especially apt arena for the cultivation of certain virtues. The answer refers to the way that, in the garden, human practices and natural processes inflect and permeate one another. Humility, for example, is fostered by recognizing one's dependence upon nature and the limits of imposing human schemes upon it.

Keywords: gardening; virtues; humility; tranquility

From ancient times to the present, a variety of broadly moral purposes have been attributed to the garden. A Chinese Song dynasty official, for instance, claimed that enjoyment of a pavilion and its surroundings would “moralise people” more effectively than preaching to them would do[1]. To

take a more recent example, each year at the Chelsea Flower Show these days, visitors will encounter "eco-gardens" that aim to encourage people to "save the planet" and forestall the suffering that will be caused by further environmental devastation.

As these examples indicate, there has indeed been variety among the many claims about the garden's moral purpose. The purposes themselves have varied from the encouragement of austere self-discipline to the reinforcement of Victorian values of industry and family life. They have ranged from inspiring a patriotic love of one's country to promoting senses of justice and community. The popular Alnwick Garden, close to where I live in the north-east of England, lists among its objectives: the well-being, education and empowerment of the "most vulnerable community members", and inspiring people to become "changemakers" equipped to address "the climate crisis".

Equally varied have been the means that have been proposed for how gardens may contribute to moral purposes. These have ranged from a didactic conveyance of moral lessons to a rather more subtle exemplification of ideals. An example of the former would be the temples in Stowe garden, one of them containing statues to commemorate ancient virtues, the other a fake ruin designed to convey that, by the 18th century, there were no virtues left to celebrate. An example of the latter would be the way in which the informal, "natural" landscapes of "Capability" Brown, also created in the 18th century, were held to exemplify the love of liberty allegedly prized by Englishmen. (Formal French gardens, by contrast, were deemed to exemplify a desire to control and dominate.) Other gardens were held to promote morality by providing apt environments for moral reflection, while yet others were intended to instil a "work ethic". (It was the belief of some Victorian writers and gardeners that vigorous gardening might divert young men and women from their preoccupation with sex.) At the Alnwick Garden, mentioned earlier, moral objectives are variously pursued through education courses, a "community fridge" to encourage responsible food practices, "climate action courses", and a "poison garden" to remind visitors of the caution with which they should treat natural environments.

It should be clear from the examples I have given that, by "moral purposes", I do not mean simply those that have to do with moral principles, rights and duties. It is with a broader — and older — conception of the moral or the ethical that I am concerned: one that refers to the good life, to the flourishing of the human condition. In this essay, I shall focus upon an especially important — and certainly a philosophically interesting — form that claims about the moral purpose of the garden, in this broader sense, have taken in several traditions. This is the idea that gardening and other garden practices may help to cultivate virtues, that they have a significant role in, one might say, the education of the virtues. By "virtues", I mean those dispositions of character that contribute positively — or at any rate are believed to do so — to leading a good and flourishing life. (I refer to garden practices, rather than simply to gardening, since while gardening may be the most central of these practices, it is not the only one. Other practices engaged in by gardeners include designing parterres or pergolas, encouraging wildlife into the garden, and placing ornaments, seats and so on in their gardens.)

The idea I want to discuss is, to be sure, a very old one — as old as the more general thought that gardens can have a moral purpose. The Roman writer Pliny the Younger's ambition, in creating his gardens, was to "cultivate [him]self" and lead "a good and genuine life"[2]. The idea is very prominent, too, in the great East Asian traditions of the garden as a "Way" (Ch. *dao*, Jap. *dō*). A Way, as understood in these traditions, is not a mere recreation, hobby or activity, but a practice of self-discipline, self-development and "bio-spiritual cultivation"[3]. The idea I am discussing is still with us in our own times, moreover, in the form, for example, of the belief that good gardening may foster an appropriate attunement and comportment to the natural world. One thinks, too, of attempts to use gardens as places where troubled young people — ones with a drug or alcohol problem, say — might recover a sense of the value of work and communion with other people[4].

The alleged virtues that garden practices have been held to cultivate are, as already indicated, very varied — patriotism, self-discipline, environmental responsibility, diligence, industry, and many others. The question that I want to address is whether there are some virtues that are, as it were, "internal" or "intrinsic" to garden practices, while others are at best only contingent or "accidental" ingredients or products of these practices. Are there, in other words, virtues that might be said to belong to the essence of gardening?

It would be possible to design a garden as a kind of assault course for training soldiers and, hence, for instilling physical courage. Wealthy Englishmen once designed gardens that contained outdoor theatres, with the aim that these would encourage aesthetic appreciation of music or drama. But we can agree, I think, that these are functions that are imposed on the garden, and that gardening per se is not especially apt for developing courage or musical appreciation. The same could be said about the use of gardens, as with the temples at Stowe, to convey moral messages through statues, inscriptions on stones, or whatever.

I would say the same, too, of, the intentionally scraggy, almost plantless and sandy "guerrilla" garden that I was shown in Germany some years ago. The garden, which contrasted vividly with the richly planted park in which it stood, was designed by its maker to prick our conscience about world poverty. Perhaps it did so, and quite effectively, but it is not intrinsic to

garden practices to encourage a concern for disparities in wealth. There are, in short, all sorts of ways in which gardens might be employed to encourage virtues or desirable attitudes — including several that I have already mentioned — but not all of these reflect, one might say, the essence of the garden or gardening. Not all of them, that is, are virtues that gardening by its very nature will foster.

By contrast, consider such virtues as patience, humility, care, hope, and what the Chinese call *jing*, a sort of "respectful reverence" for things. These, I propose, are internal to garden practices in a way that courage, musical appreciation and sympathy for the poor and hungry are not. This means, roughly speaking, that they are qualities that are necessary to good gardening. More exactly, they are qualities, at any rate, without which the gardener would have to be very fortunate to make and maintain a garden that flourishes — a garden, for example, in which the flowers beautifully blossom, the vegetables are tasty and nutritious, and the birds feel safe and welcome. One can at least imagine that, in the location of a particular garden, the weather, the soil, the wildlife and surrounding environment are so unusually benign and favourable that even impatient, careless, irreverent and overly self-confident gardeners manage to grow tasty carrots or beautiful irises. But, then, they are indeed very lucky, for the success of the garden owes little to them and much to the good fortune of circumstances.

Under normal circumstances, a virtue like humility — by which I mean a proper appreciation of one's dependence on conditions not under one's control — is essential to successful gardening. A gardener who ignores changes in the seasons or the weather does so at his considerable peril. The same is true of a virtue like care — a concern for the good of the plants, trees, or creatures with which the gardener engages. A bad gardener may neglect to prune and protect his fruit trees, but he or she will then be very fortunate if, despite this, they produce plenty of fruit.

Gardening, it goes without saying, is a skill and discipline. Its internal or intrinsic virtues are those that are normally required for the proper exercise of this skill or discipline, of this "Way". In the case of, say, judo and other martial arts, these virtues will include courage, determination and respect for one's opponent. These are the virtues internal to such arts: the timid, hesitant yet conceited fighter will be very fortunate to win a contest. In the case of garden practices, it is, instead, the "quiet" virtues — of care, humility and so on — that are paramount. Or, so I am proposing.

Why, however, do I refer to them as "quiet" virtues? The label strikes me as an appropriate one for two reasons. For a start, they are virtues that contrast with the more muscular, more strident virtues usually associated with, and perhaps necessary to, what is nowadays regularly called social and political activism. The aim of achieving global equality, say, or the objective of "saving the planet", or the attempt to get rid of a corrupt regime are goals that may be furthered by, and in turn encourage, such putative virtues as righteous anger, a burning sense of injustice, and concern for the well-being of one's grandchildren. Activism, in this sense, stands in contrast with what is often referred to as quietism. The quietist has gentler, more personal and less politically driven priorities. The virtues internal to garden practices, I am suggesting, tend towards the quietist, not the activist, end of the spectrum of moral ambitions①.

A more important reason, perhaps, for referring to the quiet virtues is the intimate association they have with a number of ancient and traditional ideals that have themselves been defined as forms of quietude. Among such goals or ideals are the *ataraxia* and *apatheia* — the freedoms from disturbance and the passions — admired by the Hellenic Greeks. Further east, we find the equanimity (*upekkha*) that is one of the "sublime states" (*brahmavihara*) which the Buddha exhorts his followers to seek. Further east still, we encounter the *wu-wei* ("inaction", or "effortless action") prized by the Daoist sages. What all of these share is the praise of a life that is tranquil, at ease, undisturbed — a life that is "happy, calm, and unshaken", as one garden lover, the Roman Stoic, Seneca, put it[5]. The quiet virtues, then, are those that are cultivated not least in order to achieve and secure quietude and related conditions, like tranquillity, in one's in life. Better, perhaps, they are cultivated as essential constituents of such a life. "Quiet virtues" seems like an apt title for virtues that conduce to these conditions.

Recognition of the quiet virtues intrinsic to garden practices is helpful, in my judgement, in explaining a number of enduring perceptions, stretching back to ancient times, of the significance of gardens. I shall focus on two of these: the perception of the garden as a place of retreat or refuge, and that of gardening as a source of understanding or wisdom.

If the quiet virtues are internal to garden practices, then one of the several senses in which the garden has often been considered as a place of retreat or refuge becomes readily intelligible. Gardens have served, very occasionally, as refuges in a quite literal sense. They have been places where people have sought physical protection or total disassociation from the outside world. More commonly discussed, however, has been the role of the garden as a place in which to find temporary relief from "the dust and grime of the world", as several Chinese texts call it, or to enjoy what Andrew Marvell in his famous poem, "Thoughts in a Garden", called "fair quiet" and "delicious solitude"[6].

More interesting, however — at least in the context of my discussion — is a more figurative or metaphorical image of the garden as refuge. I have in mind the idea of the garden as a space in which it is possible to cultivate and exercise virtues that are remarkably difficult, or even impossible, to practice and develop in the everyday, outside world

of work, business and social intercourse. Andrew Marvell lists "innocence", "repose" and "fair quiet"— things for which there is little opportunity in the busy world of everyday life — among the rewards that a garden affords[7]. Now, the quiet virtues are surely ones whose exercise in that world is also a considerable challenge. For this is an aggressive, often febrile and agonistic world that emphatically discourages, even punishes, humility, say, or forbearance and patience. There's no time or place, it seems, for such virtues in the market place, think-tank or busy office. It is the kind of world from which the Chinese literati, as much as Marvell, sought refuge in order to conduct, as they saw it, better lives, ones in which such virtues could more feasibly be exercised. For Pliny, too, it was clearly the hospitality of the garden to the quiet virtues — ones that he knew were hard, even dangerous, to exercise on the streets of Rome — that made it a place conducive to a "good and genuine" life. On this perception, the garden, one might say, is seen as a refuge for the virtues — for, in particular, those quiet virtues to which the everyday world is so inhospitable. In the garden, these virtues have the space and time in which to breathe.

An emphasis on the quiet virtues also helps to explain the ancient perception of the garden as an arena for the cultivation, not only of moral virtues, but of an understanding of the scheme of things — of reality and one's place in it. This was an understanding that, in contrast to merely theoretical or technical knowledge, was held, in ancient traditions, to constitute wisdom. Epicurus's garden in Athens has been described as providing "a form of [philosophical] education" [8]73-74②. Medieval gardens in Christian Europe were designed to intimate or illustrate religious truths. The distinguished contemporary Spanish gardener, Fernando Caruncho, speaks for many other gardeners, I suspect, in celebrating the "spiritual and cognitive experience" afforded by at least some gardens[9].

There should be no tension between emphases on both the moral and the epistemic benefits of gardening respectively, on their contribution both to the good life and to wisdom. The contrasts, here, are anyway fuzzy ones. There is no clear point at which a concern for living well diverges from one for knowledge and understanding. Thinking about — or "interrogating", as the British gardener and author, Alasdair Forbes, puts it — the way we should live is one way, after all, in which living well may be fostered[10]. And it is only in contexts that are morally favourable that the pursuit of wisdom may be possible. In the "Ways" I referred to earlier, that have played such a significant role in East Asian cultures, moral development and understanding of the world and one's place in it, are inextricably combined.

It is worth elaborating, here, on the mode of understanding or knowledge that, for Epicurus, Caruncho and others, the garden is apt for promoting or cultivating. What is not intended is the sort of propositional, empirical — perhaps technical and scientific — knowledge that might best be acquired through aggressive debate and excitable exchanges of ideas in a think-tank seminar or a brain-storming session. It is not the type of knowledge that could be arrived at by piling up data and evidence, or by undertaking some "research project". The understanding aimed at and fostered in Epicurus's garden, for example, was of "the harmonies of the cosmos" and the soul's relation to matter[8]7. The Daoist garden, wrote Maggie Keswick, aimed in its quiet way to render more salient "the inexpressible experience of the *dao*" [11]. It has been said, too, that a Zen garden both seeks to and provides a "glimpse of the world as it appears to a Zen-enlightened sensibility"[11].

These kinds of understanding do not consist in acknowledgement of the truth of certain propositions or beliefs. This is not to deny, of course, that the good gardener will need to know lots of facts — about propagation, soil acidity, weather patterns and so on. Nor, obviously, is it being denied that the good gardener requires a considerable stock of "know-how": he or she must, of course, have the skills that are needed when pruning, grafting or planting. But the kinds of understanding I want to identify are not mere bits of information that that a person might come across, nor individual "knacks" and skills.

Rather, they take the form of experiencing or sensing reality, or the way of things, for what it is. This is a form of philosophical understanding unlikely to be available to the arrogant, hubristic, impatient person absorbed in his or her daily business and engagements. Nor, indeed, is it available to people absorbed in the pursuit of technical knowledge. It is a kind of understanding, rather, that is available only to the patient, receptive person who is capable of suspending or "bracketing" everyday practical concerns, and who is willing to respond to things as they are. It is not difficult to appreciate that the kind of understanding that the garden invites is precisely the type accessible to people who possess the quiet virtues that are cultivated in the garden. It is because these virtues are exercised in the garden that gardening is a vehicle for this kind of understanding, this "form of education". Philosophical understanding, or wisdom, requires, as the ancients well knew, the exercise of humility, patience, respect, mindfulness and other quiet virtues. Wisdom, unlike the forms of knowledge that are so prized in modern societies, presupposes an openness, stillness and clarity — a sort of "innocence" — that has little place in the everyday world of "calculative", technological thought[12].

A question that readers who may be sympathetic to my conception of garden practices as cultivating the quite virtues and philosophical understanding might nevertheless want to raise is the following. Are garden practices at all unique in this? Why, if at all, they are asking, is gardening especially apt for promoting these virtues and this understanding? Couldn't other practices — and

other forms of retreat and refuge from that of the garden — be equally apt and effective? Might not retreating, like Marcel Proust, into a cork-lined room in Paris and writing an enormous novel be similarly apt? Might not driving across the USA, like Ken Kesey, in a converted, technicolor bus with some fellow hippies be equally effective?

I do not want to be dogmatic here, and to insist that only the garden can serve as a theatre for the cultivation of the quiet virtues and understanding of the way of things. But I do want to suggest that it is an especially apt space or refuge for this purpose. The reason for this must surely — and perhaps unsurprisingly — lie in gardening's engagement, and manner of engagement, with nature. It must be due to its intimate dealings with natural environments, creatures, plants and other natural entities. It is no accident that Epicurus refers to the understanding of, and comportment towards, nature that are, in the first instance, cultivated in the garden. Nor is it surprising that Daoist influenced poets, like Tao Yuanming around the turn of the 5th century, in their search for a "spontaneity" (*ziran*) that accords with the way of nature — indeed, with the *dao* itself — should have sought this in gardens.

The relationship between culture and nature is, of course, a large theme and I shall only touch upon a couple of its aspects. The English philosopher, Mary Midgley, criticized Existentialist thinkers, like Jean-Paul Sartre, for regarding the world as so much "dead matter" on which we allegedly totally free creatures may impose our wills and "projects". Had they taken notice of the "biosphere" — the world of plants and animals — they could not, she argues, have adopted this hubristic vision of the unconstrained freedom of human beings[13]. She implies, furthermore, that their failure to pay proper attention to the living world was due to their spending their lives in bars, cafés, jazz clubs, cinemas and other quintessentially urban and all-too-human venues. Midgley's message seems to be that if Sartre — who indeed hated being in the countryside, away from the city — had done a good day's gardening, he would soon have appreciated our dependence on a recalcitrant natural world and the severe limits against which our "projects" run up. More generally, Midgley is implying, it is essential to the cultivation of the quiet virtues — and even to recognizing that they are virtues — to spend time in natural environments, and to engage with them in the manner, for example, of the gardener.

But, secondly, if garden practices, through their intentional and inevitable engagement with nature, help to teach us lessons of humility and forbearance, of patience and hope, they also serve to inspire care and regard for nature. The good gardener learns not only that he or she depends for their success on the cooperation of nature, but that success is impossible without attending to the good of the plants, soil and creatures with which they engage. The gardener learns, in effect, to honour the duties of care and solicitude that ought to accompany our intrusion into the natural world. When we bring nature into the orbit of culture, art and utility, we should, at the same time, bring it into the sphere of moral concern. If the garden is a forceful reminder of our dependence on what is beyond our control, it is also a symbol of nature's dependence on — its susceptibility to — human ambitions and projects. Gardening is, perhaps, the most striking exemplification one can find of the mutual dependence — the reciprocal inflection and porousness — of human cultural practices and nature[14-15]③. And this is why, I propose, it is in a privileged position to invite, employ and foster the quiet virtues.

Notes:

① My use of the term "quietism" is distinct from various other uses as the name, for example, of a movement in 17th-century French Christian theology, or as a label for a certain style of philosophical investigation associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein.

② The author argues that, more generally, the garden is an important means for "disclosing" the world. See reference [8].

③ The use of the term "porousness" was suggested to me by Alasdair Forbes.

(Editor / LIU Yuxia)

Author:
David E. Cooper is an emeritus professor in the Department of Philosophy, Durham University, and is author of the book *A Philosophy of Gardens*. His research focuses on history of Eastern and Western philosophy, aesthetics, environmental ethics, and linguistic philosophy.

Translators:
CAO Kaizhong, Ph.D., is an associate professor in the Faculty of Art, Communication University of China, and a contributing editor of this journal. His research focuses on application of digital art in landscape architecture, and landscape architecture criticism.

ZHANG Chuhan is a Ph.D. candidate at Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology, and an engineer in Ecological Landscape Construction & Research Institute, China Architecture Design & Research Group. Her research focuses on urban design and theory.

Proofreader:
QING Feng, Ph.D., is an associate professor in the School of Architecture, Tsinghua University. His research focuses on architecture history and theory, and architectural criticism.